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Government cloud services are a new development at the intersection of electronic 
government and cloud computing which holds the promise of rendering government 
service delivery more effective and efficient. Cloud services are virtual, dynamic and 
potentially stateless which has triggered governments’ concern about data 
sovereignty. This paper explores data sovereignty in relation to government cloud 
services and how national strategies and international policy evolve. It concludes that 
for countries data sovereignty presents a legal risk which can not be adequately 
addressed with technology or through contractual arrangements alone. Governments 
therefore adopt strategies to retain exclusive jurisdiction over government information 
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Two major trends in information and communications technology (ICT) merge: First, 
the public sector is embarking on electronic government solutions for its back-office 
operations. Second, cloud computing is fundamentally changing the way how 
computing is done by providing ubiquitous, on-demand access to computing 
resources. Government cloud services hold the promise of rendering government 
service delivery and back-office operations more effective and efficient. What looks 
like an ideal match actually raises a range of unresolved issues. 
 
Electronic government describes the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in the public sector. Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer state that “[t]he 
purpose of electronic government is similar to the use of all information-handling 
technologies before: to save public resources and to make public-sector activity more 
efficient.” (2007, 4). Cloud computing holds the promise of rendering government 
service delivery more effective and efficient while providing a platform for open 
government, inter-agency cooperation and government innovation. 
 
When “information is the foundation of all governing” (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Lazer 2007, 1)  than the modern treasury of public institutions is where the wealth of 
public information is stored and processed. Government in most countries is under 
very strict obligations to ensure that public IT systems and information are secure. 
However, cloud services have been characterized as virtual, dynamic and potentially 
stateless (NIST 2009) taking information government to “a new level of abstraction” 
(Petersen, Gondree, and Beverly 2011, 1).  
 
Against this backdrop, many governments have raised the concern about data 
sovereignty when government information are moved to the cloud. How to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of public assets residing in the cloud? What 
if public information and IT systems are hosted abroad? Is government data of one 
country caught under the authority of another jurisdiction and what are the resulting 
risks? The concept of data sovereignty essentially frames this scenario and seeks to 
compensate for the progressing virtualization of information where digital data is 
stored and processed remotely. 
 
The public policy challenges of cloud computing have already attracted academic 
attention mainly with regards to the shortcomings of the present regulatory 
frameworks, international inconsistencies and the need for an enabling environment 
for cloud services. Jaeger, Lin and Grimes (2008) opened the discussion of 
information policy issues of cloud computing pertaining to privacy, security, 
anonymity, telecommunications capacity, government surveillance, reliability, and 
 2liability. In his paper Nelson (2009) focuses on governments’ role in fostering 
portability, competition and innovation in cloud services. Reed’s paper (2010) is 
discussing information “ownership” with respect to cloud services well 
acknowledging that property rights in information do not exist. Kushida, Murray and 
Zysman (2011) convey the core aspects of the cloud computing service markets with 
a view on the influence policy issues take on their development. As a burgeoning 
market and the next hype corporations, analysts and pundits discuss the national and 
international policy issues addressing policy makers with varying sets of 
recommendations (Microsoft Corporation 2010; Rayport and Heyward 2009; World 
Economic Forum, hereinafter WEF, 2011). 
 
There are a handful of studies on government cloud service mostly from the US that 
focus on the cost economies and challenges for governments’ IT migration to cloud 
services. The most comprehensive study to date by Wyld (2009) identifies ten major 
challenges facing government in implementing cloud computing that are technical, 
regulatory and organizational. His subsequent survey examines the adoption of 
government cloud service from an international perspective and what this means for 
public IT professionals (Wyld 2010). West (2010a) deals in one study with cost 
economies from government cloud services in which he analyzes available data. In 
the second study, he provides policy guidance to improve cloud computing in the 
public sector (West 2010b). Existing policy documents provide an additional source 
of information since national cloud computing strategies for the public sector are 
conclusive about the motivations, objectives and transition paths to government cloud 
services.
1 Data sovereignty is a notion which has been raised mainly in the context of 
government cloud services, but there has been no attempt to define and analyze this 
concept in the literature so far.  
 
This paper explores data sovereignty in relation to government cloud services and 
how national strategies and international policy evolve. It brings the various strands of 
literature on electronic government, public policy of cloud computing, and of 
government cloud services together. The paper contributes to the state of research in 
proposing a definition of data sovereignty for the purpose of electronic government 
and when it discusses the pertaining public policy problem. The cloud computing 
strategies of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States will be 
introduced and analyzed with a view on safeguarding data sovereignty. It will finally 
explore the argument if international agreements or European Union integration can 
address data sovereignty of government data in the clouds. The paper does not attempt 
to investigate the wider landscape of technical security and data protection in 
government cloud services. 
 
                                                 
1 See Section on Comparative Analysis of National Cloud Computing Strategies. 
 3This paper is structured as follows: The first section provides a concise introduction to 
cloud computing followed in section two by an overview over government cloud 
services and arguments. The third section turns to data sovereignty and how this 
concept is derived. The forth section delivers the comparative analysis of national 
cloud computing strategies of the four countries. The last section discusses the role of 
international policy and the European Union strategy for an internal digital market 
followed by the conclusions. 
 
About cloud computing 
Cloud computing is often referred to as the next paradigm shift in networked 
computing because it brings about computing on demand (Jaeger, Lin, and Grimes 
2008, 271; Rayport and Heyward 2009, ii, 3). In short, cloud technology overhauls 
traditional methods of computing where data is stored and software is run on 
decentralized equipment such as a desk-top computer or a local server. Instead, 
applications and data are moved to shared data centers (Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 
2011, 4), in what technologists have dubbed “the cloud” – i.e. powerful computing 
platforms which can be accessed remotely and where data resides and computing is 
performed. It is important to note that in the cloud scenario the third party which owns 
and maintains the infrastructure also controls data and applications (Jaeger, Lin, and 
Grimes 2008, 272). This positions cloud operators as a distinct type of internet 
intermediaries with their own eclectic range of policy challenges. 
 
Cloud computing has emerged as a result of a number of technological advances, 
notably (1) broadband connectivity, (2) commodity server hardware with open 
interfaces, (3) open source software for operating systems, web servers and 
distributed computing, and (4) open standards in Web 2.0 applications (Australian 
Government Department of Finance and Deregulation 2011, 11; Nelson 2009, 3). The 
know-how for distributed computing and the operation of large data centers has 
developed in the commercial sector in order to handle data and processing intensive 
services. This is particularly true of web services such as search engines which 
process a myriad of queries and online shops where concurrent transactions are 
processed (Jaeger, Lin, and Grimes 2008, 271). Internet and IT companies such as 
Amazon, Google, IBM and Microsoft are among today’s largest cloud service 
providers but there are increasingly new entrants, such as Salesforce. Open standards 
and open source software centrally buttress the development of the cloud 
infrastructure, which infused interoperability and slashes the costs of software.  
 
In the literature various definitions are proposed, yet most widely cited is that of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (hereafter NIST). Thereafter, "[c]loud 
computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
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applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction." (NIST 2009) This definition is 
composed of five characteristics which are in short revisited. First, as an on-demand 
service users can “unilaterally provision computing capabilities […] as needed 
automatically” (NIST 2009). Second, the cloud service can be accessed via broadband 
network and standard protocols which support heterogeneous clients and user 
equipment (NIST 2009). Third, resources are pooled to provision multiple users’ 
demands with physical and virtual resources, for instance storage, processing, 
memory, network bandwidth, and virtual machines (NIST 2009). Fourth, “capabilities 
can be rapidly and elastically provisioned” (NIST 2009) in order to meet demand 
lows and peaks as required by the users. Fifth, the use of the service is automatically 
measured in an abstract unit, for example storage, processing or bandwidth (NIST 
2009), based on which the utilized service is billable. 
 
Cloud computing “alters the basic economics of access to computing and storage” 
(Rayport, and Heyward 2009, ii). Through the aggregation and consolidation of 
computing needs cloud operators can realize economies of scale which significantly 
reduces the operation costs of data centers (Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2011, 2). It 
is important to note that there is not just one cloud but many and that operators vary in 
size; however, it is well established that scale economies favor size. Kushida, Murray 
and Zysman observe that “[t]he full economic promise of cloud computing depends 
on the ability to attain truly massive scale, delivering global-scale services that 
transcend traditional political and economic boundaries.” (2011, 3) The flexible 
provision, the metered use and the consumption-based pricing models have prompted 
comparisons to other utility services (Jaeger, Lin, and Grimes 2008, 271; Kushida, 
Murray, and Zysman 2011, 4; Wyld 2009, 56). Yet, the traditional concept of what is 
a utility service does not fit entirely because cloud capacity is not simply a commodity 
but can be customized to support varying functionalities (Kushida, Murray, and 
Zysman 2011, 4). Notwithstanding, it could develop into an utility of its own kind. 
 
Virtually anybody and anything from every possible background ranging from 
individuals to companies of all sizes, public, private and not-for profit organizations, 
universities and research centers etc. can use cloud services. Many popular Internet 
and Web 2.0 services of today bear characteristics of cloud services whether users 
store files, share photos, send tweets, update a profile on a social network, use web 
applications or collaborate online. Apart from benefiting from lower prices users of 
cloud services avoid upfront investments in local ICT infrastructure and software, 
skip most in-house IT management and, instead, pay for exactly the computing 
capacity they utilize (Jaeger, Lin, and Grimes 2008, 271f.; Nelson 2009, 3f.). The 
flexible provision of cloud computing can give businesses a competitive edge, faster 
time to market and even scalable services in order to meet their customers’ actual 
 5demand. The expectations and needs of users greatly vary depending on the context 
and preferences. 
 
Once cloud services mature and are widely adopted its inherent transformative power 
is predicted to benefit society at large. Access to cloud technology releases new 
capabilities for innovation and entrepreneurship, it faciliates market entry, scalability 
of operations and experimentation (Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2011, 2). 
Processing intensive tasks and applications can now be easily outsourced and 
powerful computing resources become for the first time publicly accessible. In the 
hand of researchers the available computing power enables them to tackle 
computationally-intensive problems and models from all disciplines (Nelson 2009, 4). 
It further presents an ideal infrastructure for collaboration in the research, private and 
public sector by offering a shared pool of resources to a community of users. Last but 
not least, cloud computing is put forward as a green ICT which helps reduce energy 
consumption by consolidating data centers and enhancing energetic efficiency while 
bringing down overcapacities (OECD 2010b, 22; Rayport and Heyward 2009, 42). 
 
Following the NIST taxonomy four different models of cloud computing are 
commonly deployed. The private cloud is an infrastructure which is operated 
exclusively for one client or organization which is managed either by the organization 
itself or on behalf of it by a third party (NIST 2009). A community cloud is a shared 
infrastructure with a common framework that supports a specific community managed 
by the organizations or a third party (NIST 2009). A public cloud infrastructure “is 
made available to the general public or a large industry group and is owned by an 
organization selling cloud services.” (NIST 2009) Finally, the hybrid cloud combines 
two or more clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but 
share some infrastructure, for example to balance the load between the clouds (NIST 
2009). In all cases it does not matter where the data center is physically located; 
however, mainly for security reasons the private and the community cloud 
infrastructure are often kept on premise. Further distinctions and assessment models 
can be used to describe various types of clouds under technical and commercial 
aspects.
2 For the purpose of this paper it it sufficient to understand that cloud services 
are virtual, dynamic and potentially stateless (NIST 2009). 
 
Government cloud services 
The substantial promise of cloud services meets the pronounced interest of many 
governments worldwide which are conscious about how they spend taxpayers money 
and are keenly seeking ways how to do more with less (Wyld 2009, 20). The public 
sector is very large and sometimes is even the biggest user of ICT in a given country; 
                                                 
2 For a taxonomy of cloud services see Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2011; Nelson 2009. 
 6centralizing government’s computational needs can leverage significant economies of 
scale. In most countries the public ICT infrastructure, however, replicates government 
organization with many dispersed data centers serving the needs of specific 
government departments. Additionally, the server utilization has been reportedly low - 
sometimes as low as seven percent - keeping generous contingencies with the 
consequence that massive overcapacity are left unexploited (The Brookings 
Institution 2010, 3, 6). Government cloud services promise to overcome this 
fragmentation by consolidating data centers and using storage space more effectively. 
 
The most immediate objective of government cloud strategies is to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency of administrative processes (Kundra 2010, 9). Wyld 
identifies governments’ need to save public resources to be one of the main drivers of 
government cloud services’ take-up (2009, 10f.). Analysts predicted for the US that 
moving public sector operations to cloud services could eventually save from 65 to 85 
percent of federal agencies’ yearly ICT budgets (Booz Allen Hamilton 2009, 5). 
Although most estimates concur with the finding that government cloud services will 
curb public spending in IT services the prognosticated savings vary considerably 
(West 2010a, 2f.). West points out that the cost economies are determined by many 
factors, such as how extensive the migration is, which type of cloud is deployed and 
the level of security sought (2010a, 3f.). On a cautionary note, a 2009 report disputed 
these cost savings for large entities altogether (McKinsey 2009). It maintains that 
compared to large enterprise data centers, current cloud computing offerings are not 
per se more cost-effective (McKinsey 2009). Some customized features of cloud 
service such as exclusivity and enhanced security drive up the operational costs 
compared to the most basic offerings. Given the uncertainties and the complexity 
surrounding cost economies, governments are well advised to conduct a thorough 
cost-benefit-analysis.  
 
Beyond the possible financial upside cloud computing carries a number of attractive 
promises for the public sector. Through cloud services the otherwise expensive and 
time consuming IT systems administration is essentially outsourced. For the public 
sector which has arguably difficulties competing for skilled personnel and 
maintaining state of the art IT systems, this may come at the very least as a relief, if 
not a rescue (Nelson 2009, 4). Because it is a remotely accessible on-demand service 
cloud computing overcomes the locational imperative which plays out in two 
important ways. First, countries can potentially procure services on an international 
scale. Nelson (2009, 4) asserts that developing countries can access via the cloud the 
latest computing technologies provided they have an adequate Internet infrastructure 
at avail. At the level of the infrastructure it does not matter whether the required 
broadband networks are fixed or wireless; however, where countries or regions are 
excluded from cloud services for reasons of bandwidth, the digital divide between the 
developed and the developing world deepens. Second, cloud computing further 
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Schönberger and Lazer 2007, 7) which could be transformed considering different 
objectives, for example the decentralization of government and public services.  
 
As a tool of electronic government cloud computing can facilitate the enhanced 
transparency aspired to in a modern democratic society. According to Kundra, the US 
Federal Chief Information Officer, it is the ideal platform for the movement of open 
data wherein the government democratizes its data (The Brookings Institute 2010, 14) 
and shares it with the public.  Ultimately, the whole process of governance can 
become more transparent and inclusive while enhancing the deliberative capacity of 
public institutions by admitting stakeholders to follow and to contribute to policy 
formulation. Note that in line with the prevalent electronic government discourse a 
technology alone does not transform government (Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer 
2007, 4f.) but it is upon the government to yield these results or, conversely, to 
confine the implementation of a technology to merely an efficiency enhancing 
measure. 
 
Also within government cloud computing is believed to set free innovative potential 
“not as a magic wand for solving hard computing and managerial problems” (Nelson 
2009, 8) but in the pursuit of enhancing efficiency it eases implementation of many 
computerized government operations. The collaborative feature of the new platform 
once fully realized can foster cooperation and collaboration across government 
departments which may form another source for innovation (Nelson 2009, 8; Rayport 
and Heyward 2009, 45). Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer (2007, 7) observe that 
reducing the locational imperative may undermine prevailing organizational structures 
based on hierarchical principles – the so called information silos. Robinson et al 
(2010, 46) emphasize the potential to unbundle public services from traditional lines 
of service delivery. The new environment stimulates what is known as the new public 
management imperative of networked government which postdates rigid bureaucratic 
systems and hierarchies (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 7). Governmental cloud 
services can accommodate new interagency collaborative models and new public-
private governance networks. 
 
These benefits make a compelling case, but a range of obstacles have to be overcome 
before government back-offices could embark on this technology. One of the soft 
factors is that public sector IT management needs to shift mentally from dedicated 
local infrastructure to a strategy of inclusive government-wide cloud platforms (The 
Brookings Institution 2009, 8, 38). In practice this is not trivial because consolidation 
may be resisted by government departments in fear of losing influence, funds, 
headcount and control. Often the organizational legacy fragments the public sector 
use of IT with a patchwork of different regulations and procurement formalities (UK 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2009, 211; West 2010b, 5) which need 
 8to be updated first. For instance, Kundra highlights the costly replication of 
certification procedures in the US where vendors have to “certify their solutions with 
hundreds of agencies” (The Brookings Institution 2009, 9). Eventually, the migration 
from legacy systems to government cloud services poses a unique challenge because 
the various IT systems need to be integrated in order to achieve government-wide 
utility. 
 
Security is probably the most significant concern that the government shares with 
other users of cloud computing (Jaeger, Lin, and Grimes 2008, 274; WEF 2011, 8; 
West 2010b, 6). Government in most countries is under very strict obligations to 
ensure that public IT systems as well as public information and records are secure.
3 
Security is a wide notion which includes all accidental or intentional incidents which 
may harm the confidentiality, integrity or availability of public resources due to, for 
example, technical failure or unauthorized access.
4 It is controversial whether 
government cloud services indeed create a riskier environment compared to local 
equipment where the perception of security appears to be higher but this is not 
necessarily true (West 2010b, 6; Wyld 2009, 36f.). Nelson argues in favor of unified 
cloud infrastructure which is more secure and reliable than “trying to maintain and 
manage hundreds of different systems” (2009, p. 9; ENISA 2011, 83; Wyld 2009, 
36f.). 
 
In fact, governments’ security concerns resonate often with the loss of ownership and 
control in a cloud computing environment where a third party operates the data 
centers. One fraction of this inhibition has become known as governments’ quest for 
data sovereignty – a burgeoning concept about retaining undiminished control over 
data in the cloud. For governments, ensuring data sovereignty has become a 
paramount concern (ENISA 2011, 40) which is calling for investigation into the 
notion, challenges and policies of data sovereignty. 
 
Data sovereignty 
The so much dreaded loss of sovereignty over data is a reflection of the initial finding 
that cloud computing is virtual, dynamic and essentially stateless (NIST 2009). In a 
cloud environment information and the capacity it consumes are virtual assets and 
users’ effective means of exercising control are greatly diminished. For example, 
users have to rely on the operator to locate where their information reside in the cloud 
but have no own means to establish its whereabouts (Petersen, Gondree and Beverly 
                                                 
3 For example statutory compliance with the US Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the General Services 
Administration (GSA). 
4 It is well beyond the scope of this paper to cover all possible security risks in a cloud environment 
which are discussed at length elsewhere (ENISA 2009; 2011). 
 92011, 1; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2010, 6). The dynamic nature of 
cloud services takes an additional toll on data sovereignty. Server capacity and 
computing cycles are used where it is cheapest (similar to least cost routing) and 
where there is spare capacity information is constantly passed around (Jaeger, Lin, 
and Grimes 2008, 276). Such optimization strategies, although perfectly legitimate 
from an economic point of view, render data hosting truly a moving target with 
unpredictable legal consequences. In addition, the same information is likely to be 
stored in multiple locations in order to back them up against losses and outages (Wyld 
2009, 41). Finally, the statelessness should not be confused with lawlessness because 
cloud services are likely to transgress various jurisdictions. This globalization in turn 
triggers complicated dislocation where information stemming from one country is 
potentially exposed to one or several foreign jurisdictions. Operators of cloud 
computing services raise that they are “subject to divergent, and at times conflicting, 
rules governing jurisdiction over user content and data.” (Microsoft Corporation 2010, 
7)  
 
What this concern means in practice can be best illustrated by looking at lawful 
interception, search and seizure authorities. In democratic countries the standard of 
protection against unreasonable searches is that law enforcement agencies have to 
obtain a search warrant before they can examine personal files stored on the harddrive 
of someone’s computer (Nelson 2009, 10). However, in some jurisdictions, such as 
the US, cloud computing may be treated differently and the threshold of intervention 
can be significantly lower because the data has been handed over to a third party 
(Rayport and Heyward 2009, 37; West 2010b, 6; Wyld 2009, 43). As a result data 
residing on a cloud platform would be less protected than data on a personal harddrive 
or local servers. 
 
If now a cloud service produces an additional crossborder effect the question arises: 
how many countries’ local laws apply given that the physical establishment of the 
service provider, the country of origin of the user or of the data, and the actual data 
location could all be used as relevant criteria to establish jurisdiction? Intelligence 
services may enjoy even greater discretion to access data in the clouds due to these 
issues. The US PATRIOT Act is a notoriously cited example of a law which allows 
US government to request the disclosure of “any data stored in any datacenter, 
anywhere in the world if that system is operated by a US-based company.” (Kushida, 
Murray, and Zysman 2011, 12) Most authors agree that such sweeping authorities can 
produce a deterrent effect for potential users of cloud services (Jaeger et al 2009; 
Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2011, 12; Rayport and Heyward 2009, 38; Thibodeau 
2011; Wyld 2009, 41).  
 
Against this background the notion of data sovereignty unfolds which is in itself not 
limited to the cloud computing scenario, even though this is where the concern is 
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has been made, and this section therefore sets out to develop a definition for the 
purpose of this paper. When Petersen, Gondree, and Beverly (2011, 1) refer to data 
sovereignty as the ability to “establish data location […] for placing it in the border of 
a particular nation state,” this is mainly for the purpose of verifying and controlling 
the geo-location of data in the cloud. What is in the first place a condition for linking 
data to a jurisdiction this notion does not fully capture the essence of retaining 
sovereignty over data. 
 
It also needs to be maintained that information are not protected as property as such. 
Depending on the circumstances intellectual property law, data protection law and 
laws protecting confidentiality and trade secrets may apply (Reed 2010, 1). Reed 
stresses that “the composite effect of these laws gives […] a level of control over its 
information which is very similar to owning physical property” (2010, 1). Information 
‘ownership’, however, is a non-legalistic term commonly used to describe the 
relationship of somebody holding and administrating information on his or her own 
behalf. So understood it does not convey property rights. 
 
As a point of departure sovereignty which is an established concept in philosophy and 
political science provides some initial insight. In spite of varying meanings 
throughout history, at its core it refers to supreme authority within a territory (Philpott 
2010). Absolute sovereignty is composed of a positive and a negative meaning which 
only if taken together produces the desired effect. Its positive component could be 
circumscribed as the legitimate right to exercise authority which is matched by the 
negative component that no other authority could be legitimately invoked in this 
realm. In a next step this notion will be applied to data, which are intangible assets, 
and in relation to cloud services. 
 
Contrary to national sovereignty data sovereignty describes a strategy to retain 
authority and control over digital information, for example through security measures. 
Apart from the ability to exercise full control over one’s own data it entails that the 
data is not subject to any other authority that could demand access and retrieval. 
Already at this stage is becomes clear that data sovereignty is in practice rarely 
absolute because a state invokes authority over its subjects and their assets. Hence, 
individuals and private organizations can not enjoy full sovereignty over information 
but strive for authority and control within the boundaries of a given legal framework.  
 
Only where the national authority is identical with the data owner (such as in the case 
of governments) one could conceive of absolute sovereignty, however, so far limited 
to the corresponding and exclusive jurisdiction. Negative sovereignty can be 
interfered with by malicious acts of cybercrime and is challenged whenever another 
jurisdiction lays claim on the data because it resides on the territory of a third state or 
 11– as it is the case with the US PATRIOT Act - the cloud service provider is subject to 
rules that oblige it to hand over clients’ data irrespective where it is stored (ENISA 
2011, 40; West 2010b, 8). What government and other private users of international 
cloud services have in common is the risk of their data being exposed to the additional 
authority of yet another country. This cumulative effect appears to be a major shared 
concern.  
 
The literature discussing the bearing of cloud computing on the right to privacy and 
the trade-offs of international data transfers develop a similar line of argument 
(Jaeger, Lin and Grimes 2008; Nelson 2009; Rayport and Heyward 2009). But it is 
important to note that in spite of significant overlaps with privacy and data protection 
concepts the notion of data sovereignty is wider because it is not limited to personal 
information only. Every digital snippet can be data and not everything is linked to an 
individual in such a way as it would be required for data protection laws to apply. 
Moreover, the potential uses and applications of cloud computing exceed personal 
data processing. For example business secrets, computing algorithms, mathematical 
modulations, physical simulations, and trade inventories or anonymized data is in 
need of a new paradigm when moved to and stored in the cloud. The rational for data 
sovereignty is not in the first place the protection of human dignity but something 
akin to the right to property and the right to the inviolable (digital) home. In a 
nutshell, what is missing in the information society is the comprehensive right to 
information ownership. 
 
Far from being an established legal concept data sovereignty can be perceived as an 
information ownership claim which compensates for the progressing virtualization of 
information where digital data is stored and processed remotely. It covers therefore all 
legitimate expectations owners of all types of data entertain with respect to autonomy, 
control, security, privacy and the rule of law. These expectations may vary as does the 
legitimacy. For example lawful interception authority -- if well crafted and reasonably 
applied -- may be in conflict with the expectation of privacy but not legitimately so. It 
is not possible to determine the exact scope of data sovereignty regardless of the 
physical location of data and without a complete understanding of legal frameworks 
applying. Therefore, any definition in order to be meaningful would need to be set in 
its proper context. Using data sovereignty as a catchword like it is often done in 
contemporary public policy discourse may actually obfuscate more than contributing 
to an informed debate. 
 
Turning now to governments cloud services above all, it should be recognized that 
governments have special considerations for which they want to retain sovereignty 
over public records and applications. Reasons are national security and defense, law 
enforcement, statutory duties of confidentiality, citizens’ privacy protection, 
compliance with territoriality clauses in contracts and intellectual property rights etc. 
 12In particular, governments resent the idea that any foreign power could exercise 
legitimate authority over their data (Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2011, 12; 
Thibodeau 2011; Wyld 2009, 41). What distinguishes the public sector from the 
private sector is the ability to approximate absolute data sovereignty as long as 
exclusive jurisdiction over public data can be maintained. Hence, data sovereignty in 
the context of government data can be defined as: 
 
Government’s control over all virtual public assets, which are not in the public 
domain, irrespective whether they are stored on own or third parties’ facilities 
and premises, and which are governed under an effective information 
assurance framework, including, where appropriate, strategies to retain 
exclusive jurisdiction over government information. 
 
For the purpose of this definition information assurance is the practice of managing 
ICT related risks in order to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability.
5 It 
describes the set of rules and conditions for government to retain effective autonomy, 
security (covering confidentiality, integrity and availability), privacy and in 
appropriate cases exclusive jurisdiction over government data. 
 
It is possible to address many of these requirements flowing from data sovereignty 
considerations with commercial offerings. The relationship with the cloud service 
provider are shaped via so called Service Level Agreements (SLAs) which stipulate 
the technical and legal obligations. Through procurement rules and with their 
bargaining power governments should be able to reach appropriate SLAs in particular 
concerning technical security. As a commercial agreement it does not, however, 
prevent third governments to invoke their authority. Because absolute sovereignty is 
not a commercial proposition governments set out to shape the conditions which 
guarantee undiminished sovereignty: Since sovereignty ties in with territoriality 
sensitive government information stay confined to national borders. This translates 
into a preference for national cloud services by governments which in many ways 
clashes with the global reach of cloud services. 
Analysis of national cloud computing strategies 
Depending on their electronic government maturity governments expand their 
existing strategies on the implementation of electronic government infrastructure to 
cloud computing strategies. Quite a number of countries have already drawn up or are 
in the process of devising their national cloud computing strategies for the public 
sector. This paper introduces and analyses comparatively the approaches to ensure 
                                                 
5 Note that the Information Assurance concept can also cover five values, i.e. availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) 
2010). 
 13data sovereignty in cloud computing of – in this order -- the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. These four countries have been selected because of 
the progress made in adopting a strategy and their representative approaches with 
regards to protecting national data sovereignty. 
 
United States 
In 2009, the US Federal Government’s Cloud Computing Initiative was announced 
(Kundra 2010, 2) followed by the release of the National Cloud Computing Strategy 
in 2011 (Kundra 2011). The central argument is that “for the Federal Government, 
cloud computing holds tremendous potential to deliver public value by increasing 
operational efficiency and responding faster to constituent needs.” (Kundra 2011, 1) 
Migration to the cloud is with a potential target of 20 billion dollar one of the main 
budget items of federal IT expenditures which could eventually help save public 
money (1). In order to accelerate the pace of government take-up of cloud services the 
Federal CIO Council instituted a Cloud First policy which prescribes to explore first 
cloud service offerings before other new IT investments (2). The move towards cloud 
computing has to be viewed in the context with the initiative to consolidate federal 
data centers. 
 
It is noteworthy that the NIST resumed the technical advisory role and contributes to 
definition and standard setting activities which essentially buttressed the federal 
approach
6 and are also an important point of reference for governments elsewhere 
(Danek 2010; ENISA 2011; Australian Government Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 2011).  
 
The Federal Government is under the legal obligation to ensure security requirements 
such as compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), 
agency specific policies pursuant to the Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS) and many more rather fragmented and sometimes hard to comply with rules 
(WYLD 2009, 43).
7 Against this backdrop the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy 
explains the parameters for public organizations to consider when identifying their 
needs and planning cloud migration (Kundra 2011, 11f.). Value und readiness are the 
dimensions which determine an agency’s roadmap. The strategy formulates a risk-
based approach when determining what type of cloud service is appropriate (2011, 
26). In other words it does not mandate the use of specific deployment solutions, such 
as a private cloud, but encourages to explore hybrid and community cloud offerings if 
they are adequate in addressing the associated risk level (or impact category).  
                                                 
6 Corresponding to its statutory responsibilities for developing standards and guidelines under the 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347. 
7 FISMA defines three information security objectives, namely confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, and FIPS Publication 199 distinguishes three levels of potential impacts in the case of a 
security breach, i.e. low, medium and high impact (FIPS 2004). 
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Albeit data sovereignty is an explicitly acknowledged concern (2011, 30) it is not 
further explained how it will be treated. It can be assumed that it is considered as part 
of the risk management framework (2011, 26f.). However, many cloud service 
providers are US companies which may alleviate the problematic to some extent. 
West observes that agencies with high security needs generally require that 
information be stored in secure facilities within the continental US (2010b, 8). 
Government cloud services of the low-impact category could be in principle hosted in 
data centers abroad, however, some remain skeptical. Wyld comments that 
“[g]overnment at all levels has unique considerations, at the US federal, and certainly 
at the city and state and local level, we have concerns about the data residing within 
the US borders and not being at a cloud center somewhere around the world, […]” 
(The Brookings Institution 2010, 23). 
 
United Kingdom 
In 2009, the Digital Britain report was published which outlines the central policy 
commitments in the UK government’s strategy to modernize the country and place it 
at the leading edge of the global digital economy. Reforming the public sector is one 
policy priority which covers broadly the further introduction and improvement of 
digital government as it is called in the report. Under the umbrella of efficient public 
sector procurement the vision of the G-Cloud is introduced which describes a 
dedicated cloud computing platform for sharing network-delivered services across 
government departments (UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2009, 
212). The public cloud scenario, “where services can run on any server anywhere in 
the world,” does not meet governmental needs for “data location, security, data 
recovery, availability and reliability.” (213) It tasks the CIO Council to prepare the 
adoption of the G-Cloud as “a priority for government investments […] to secure 
efficiencies […] over the next three years.” (UK Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills 2009, 213) 
 
From the outset, the G-Cloud has been designed as a private government operated 
cloud infrastructure based on UK territory (UK Cabinet Office 2010a, 22; 2010b, 27). 
Besides, public cloud services co-exist and are already deployed by some public 
sector bodies, for example for services that do not process personal data (UK Cabinet 
Office 2010b, 4). Once constraints for UK’s information assurance requirements can 
be addressed, including data centers being outside the UK, the use of public cloud 
service is expected to grow (4f.). For the time being G-Cloud private cloud services 
do already address these concerns and “enable earlier use of the shared utility model 
across the public sector” (5). A cloud first imperative requires the public sector to 
explore cloud service options before turning to other IT investments. The G-Cloud is 
accompanied by a data center consolidation strategy. 
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After a public consultation the Australian Government published its Cloud Computing 
Strategy in 2011. The adoption of government cloud services is appropriate “where 
they demonstrate value for money and adequate security” meeting the mandatory 
requirements outlined in the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) 
(Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation 2011, 5). The 
strategy lists the need to be aware of data sovereignty requirements among the legal 
and regulatory risks (15). The need to be aware of legislative and regulatory 
requirements in other geographic regions is illustrated with the example of the US 
PATRIOT Act which is considered “a key concern for data stored in the cloud and 
located within the United States” (15). There is no prescription of the type of cloud 
services but decisions have to be based on a risk-managed approach which is taking 
into account information assurance requirements. Thus, low-risk services, such as 
government websites, could be run on a public cloud infrastructure. There are 
indications that apart from data sovereignty constraints regulations such as data 
protection laws and financial regulations may force domestic cloud services in some 
areas. The whole-of-government approach to cloud would be integrated with a data 
centre consolidation strategy. 
 
Canada 
Canada is trying to position itself as a suitable location for cloud infrastructure due to 
its cooler ambient climate, low population density, existing fibre networks and 
reliable power supply (Danek 2009). The Canadian government’s cloud strategy is not 
well documented. In 2010, apparently the Government of Canada’s cloud computing 
roadmap was endorsed (Danek 2010, 4). The approach to cloud computing rests on 
the NIST foundation and plans are to set-up the Government of Canada community 
cloud (9). The Canadian Policy on Management of Information Technology and the 
corresponding Government Security Policy endorse a security risk management 
approach which would also apply to the contracting of government cloud services. 
 
Already in 2006, the Canadian Government issued a federal strategy to come to terms 
with the USA PATRIOT Act and transborder data flows (The Treasury Board of 
Canada Secretariat 2006). In order to protect the personal data of Canadian citizens 
the strategy advocates a risk-based approach to the protection of personal information. 
The policy document institutes as a rule that all outsourcing involving personal data 
has to be completed within Canada (22). It follows, that the Canadian Government 
would be confined to domestic cloud services whenever personal data of Canadian 
citizens is involved. As a means to establish control additional guidance for the 
contracting out of government information requires the agreement to be explicit about 
that the information is the property of the Government of Canada.  
 
Comparative analysis of national data sovereignty strategies 
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breadth and pace of their national cloud computing strategies. Australia and Canada 
are both on track and willing to adopt government cloud services but arguably with 
less agility. Ultimately, all countries’ cloud computing strategies have been caught by 
concerns about the cloud’s inherent data sovereignty problem. They consider data 
sovereignty a legal risk which can not be adequately addressed with technology or 
through contractual arrangements alone. The Australian and Canadian policies are 
outspoken about their constraint against authorities like the US PATRIOT Act. 
However, no country mandates across-the-board domestic cloud services although 
every country is selectively enforcing the territoriality paradigm. 
 
All countries operate a mixed approach in which also public and cross-border 
government cloud scenarios are possible. All countries surveyed rely on risk 
management strategies in order to decide which cloud solution is adequate to meet a 
specific government need, for example pertaining to the security level. Risk 
assessments needs to comply with extensive government standards on IT security, 
also referred to as information assurance, in the course of which data sovereignty 
constraints come to play (see also ENISA 2009, 24). Yet, with different justifications 
each country has a certain disposition for keeping data within their national borders. 
In Australia and Canada data protection laws are a dominant factor in this regards. 
The UK’s G-Cloud is specifically designed as a domestic facility. One could even 
argue whether the G-Cloud’s architecture meets the definition of cloud computing 
concerning scalability. In the US’s public sector arguably a preference for domestic 
cloud computing prevails. 
 
If and how international law can contribute to create better conditions for international 
cloud computing and the extent to which this actually benefits data sovereignty is 
discussed in the last section below. 
 
Multi-lateral regulation of cloud services 
The pursuit of new international standards 
When governments stress the international policy dimension of cloud computing and 
the unresolved policy issues coming with it they increasingly acknowledge the need 
for international standards (Australian Government Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 2011, 15; Kundra 2011, 30). For the US Federal Chief Information 
Officer Vivek Kundra data sovereignty is a legitimate challenge which cannot be 
addressed by technology alone: “It is going to be a question of international law, and 
treaties that we will need to engage in the coming years." (Kundra in Walker 2011) 
The legal uncertainties associated with international applications of cloud computing 
today are cited as one of the reasons why corporate users and the public sector 
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governance framework for cloud computing is compelling, however, it is very 
controversial how data sovereignty should be addressed in such a multi-lateral 
agreement. Initial proposals discussed at the World Economic Forum which call for 
the creation of a new universal body to oversee cloud computing are met with 
concerns that this will create inadequate regulation (WEF 2011, 16). 
 
The prospects of a multi-lateral agreement which is not based on mutual trust are dim. 
Whether for data sovereignty it would be sufficient if countries under the rule of law 
ensure that national authority over data residing in the cloud adhere to due process 
requirements, especially requiring a warrant, and grant transparency is controversially 
discussed (Rayport and Heyward 2009, 49). It would certainly help to alleviate some 
of the constraints inhibiting governments and also the private sector if sweeping law 
enforcement authority is re-adjusted to internationally accepted levels. 
 
It would be farfetched to believe that jurisdictions in cyberspace can be completely 
redefined in order to accommodate data sovereignty regardless where the data resides. 
Perhaps, it is even not desirable. The only real-world example in which sovereignty 
can take precedent over a given jurisdiction is actually the guarantee of diplomatic 
immunity which has a long tradition in international diplomacy and is codified in the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. The Convention grants 
diplomatic privileges and immunities for diplomats, to diplomatic missions and 
facilities, for diplomatic archives, documents, official correspondence and diplomatic 
bags, all of which are under certain conditions inviolable and declared immune from 
search, requisition, attachment or execution (Vienna Convention 1961, Articles 22f.).
8 
This example, however, is much more suitable to illustrate the exceptionality of 
foreign sovereignty in a given jurisdiction and can not be regarded a viable solution to 
guarantee blanket sovereignty for every government information residing in the cloud. 
 
However, it is not the first time that transborder data flows and its economic and 
political repercussions have been in the focus of an international public policy debate. 
Already in 1977, Louis Joinet, the then President of the French Commission nationale 
de l’informatique et des Libertés, observed that “the ability to store and process 
certain types of data may well give one country political and technological advantage 
over other countries. This in turn may lead to a loss of national sovereignty through 
supranational data flows.” (Joinet in Eger 1987) During the 1980ies international 
standard-setting activities pertaining to the protection of personal data while allowing 
for them to be transferred abroad took place. Notably, the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (hereinafter OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, 1980) and the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection 
                                                 
8 This does not prevent covered intelligence gathering completely, see for example Spiegel Online 
International. “US Diplomats Told to Spy on Other Countries at United Nations”. 28 November 2010. 
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Convention 108, 1981), have been devised with a view to create the conditions which 
would facilitate transborder flows of personal data (OECD 2010, 12). 
 
As a means to this end both international instruments set forth common data 
processing standards for personal information which provide for a minimum of 
harmonization and thus, allow for data movement to other countries which comply 
with the same set of rules. Essentially, countries do not attempt to retain sovereignty 
over personal data from their citizens but are satisfied that receiving countries in 
which legal disputes would be adjudicated adhere to the data protection principles set 
out in the agreement. In this context the individual dimension of data sovereignty is 
foremost at stake because the consequences of a loss of sovereignty are mainly borne 
by the individuals to which the data belongs. Notably the cross-border enforcement of 
data protection laws has been a thorny issue and citizens from one country may find it 
difficult to exercise their rights in a third country to which their personal data has 
been transferred. 
 
Ironically, what is deemed sufficient to protect citizens’ personal data going abroad 
government do widely not perceive as adequate for the bulk of government 
information because data sovereignty is largely unresolved. Arguably, governmental 
users have different expectations on cloud services than the gross of the individual 
users for whom a change of jurisdiction and public authority does in most cases not 
matter as long as data protection regulation is complied with and the rule of law 
applies. In terms of sensitivity, however, personal information can be similar to many 
governmental data which should be an argument for ensuring a similar level of 
protection of data residing in the cloud. As a blueprint for an international governance 
framework for cloud computing existing international agreements on transborder 
flows of personal data cannot satisfy completely. Despite the harmonization from the 
common data protection standards national regulations greatly vary in detail and other 
national sectoral laws have to be taken account of. Moreover, the Convention 108 and 
OECD Privacy Guidelines do not resolve the problematic that transborder data flows 
can cause multiple jurisdictions adding-up which causes the much dreaded legal 
complexity. 
 
What can be achieved, therefore, with a multi-lateral approach is to clarify who has 
jurisdiction over information during transit, while stored and processed, and efforts to 
avoid multiple jurisdictions as well as defining the minimum due process 
requirements for law enforcement surveillance, search and seizure of cloud 
infrastructure. When looking at the European Union the digital internal market with 
respect to cloud computing is still very much of an ideal, however, the available 
instruments to achieve further integration are explored below. 
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For the EU achieving an internal market for cloud computing would be a very 
worthwhile policy investment in the economic prospects and competitiveness of the 
region. In the Digital Agenda, a strategic policy paper, the European Commission 
recommends to develop “an EU-wide strategy on "cloud computing" notably for 
government and science” (European Commission 2010, 23). Neelie Kroes, the 
Commissioner responsible for the Digital Agenda, made it clear that the legal 
framework is part of the work for the envisaged cloud strategy focusing on an update 
of the EU data and privacy protection instruments and statutory user rights taking into 
account the international dimension of cloud technology (2011, 2). The Commission’s 
work in progress concerns other legal provisions as well that influence the 
deployment of cloud computing in public and private organizations (2011, 2). This 
outlook remains too vague to make a prognoses about the breadth and scope of the 
projected EU strategy but the language is reminiscent of economic integration through 
harmonization of national laws. This would not bring about a breakthrough on data 
sovereignty guarantees since the European Commission is more likely to develop 
their existing policy trajectories such as personal data and consumer protection. 
 
Within its remit the so called Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection proposes to 
reduce the complexity stemming from multiple jurisdictions within the EU through 
strengthening the country of origin principle (Article 29 Working Party on Data 
Protection 2010, 31). Under this proposal the relevant criterion to determine 
applicable data protection law would be the location of the main establishment of the 
controller of the data, i.e. the person or entity which owns the data. The geo-location 
of data itself is irrelevant under the present data protection framework (8). What may 
help to simplify the otherwise conflicting application of data protection laws in a 
situation where several Member States are involved does not much to improve data 
sovereignty because of the limited scope of application and many overriding national 
competences. 
 
Wyld prognoses a cooperation of Member States for an EU cloud infrastructure 
(2010, 8). An interesting utopian idea is promoted by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) which recommends “national governments 
and European Union institutions to further investigate the concept of a European 
Governmental cloud as a supra national virtual space where a consistent and 
harmonized set of rules could be applied, both in terms of legislation and security 
policy and where interoperability and standardization could be fostered.” (2011, 9) 
The document does not elaborate further what this new cloud is about, and how it can 
be achieved. An supra national virtual space where authority is exercised under a 
common set of rules would be a way of guaranteeing data sovereignty acceptable to 
Member States. The establishment of a similar safe harbor knows no precedent and 
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with an international agreement in order to gain data sovereignty. Whether such a 
proposal has any realistic chance to succeed depends on many factors but foremost 
how far countries are satisfied with their national strategies and if the European Union 
is willing to invest its sovereignty (regime sui generis) in such a project. 
 
Conclusions 
If cloud computing is the next paradigm in computing than governments can not miss 
this trend and continue to migrate public digital assets to cloud services. Governments 
find themselves in the dilemma to ensure sovereignty over data residing in the cloud 
which is virtual, dynamic and potentially stateless. Data sovereignty is an ideal 
conception of information ownership which compensates for the progressing 
virtualization of information where digital data is stored and processed remotely. For 
governments this means: 
 
Government’s control over all virtual public assets, which are not in the public 
domain, irrespective whether they are stored on own or third parties’ facilities 
and premises, and which are governed under an effective information 
assurance framework, including, where appropriate, strategies to retain 
exclusive jurisdiction over government information. 
 
Countries treat this issue as a legal risk which can not be adequately addressed with 
technology or through contractual arrangements alone. Hence, in applying their 
national risk management strategy the countries surveyed (US, UK, Australia, and 
Canada) restrict cloud solutions for sensitive government information (medium- and 
high-risk) to their territory which contradicts the cloud technology’s global 
philosophy. 
 
The call for international policy to remedy the complexity of divergent, and at times 
conflicting, regulations of different countries pertaining to cloud computing can help 
to establish a viable commercial environment. International standard-setting may, 
however, not go far enough to provide a solution to governments’ data sovereignty 
concerns over transborder flows of government data. From a risk-management point 
of view the territoriality paradigm which favors national cloud services would 
preempt any international agreement build on mutual trust. 
 
Besides, the concept of data sovereignty offers a proposition how to strengthen the 
link between the data owner and the all types of data not limited to the protection of 
personal information. Cloud computing presents a scenario to argue that it is not 
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enough to update and harmonize existing regulation but to take information 
ownership rights to a new level.  
References 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. 2010. Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law. 
WP 179. Adopted on December 16. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation. 2011. “Cloud 
Computing Strategic Direction Paper”. http://www.finance.gov.au/e-
government/strategy-and-
governance/docs/final_cloud_computing_strategy_version_1.pdf (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
Booz Allen Hamilton. 2009. “The Economics of Cloud Computing. Addressing the 
Benefits of Infrastructure in the Cloud”. 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Economics-of-Cloud-Computing.pdf (accessed 
June 25, 2011). 
 
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS). 2010. National Information 
Assurance (IA) Glossary. CNSS Instruction No. 4009. April 26. 
http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssi_4009.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Council of Europe. 1981. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CETS No.: 108). Adopted in Strasbourg, 28. 
January 1981. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm (accessed 
June 25, 2011). 
 
Curtin, Gregory G. 2007. “E-Government”. The Encyclopedia of Political 
Communications, Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
 
Danek, Jirka, CTO at Public Works Government Services Canada. 2009. Cloud 
Computing ad the Canadian Environment. October 6. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/20818613/Cloud-Computing-and-the-Canadian-
Environment#archive (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Danek, Jirka, CTO at Public Works Government Services Canada. 2010. Government 
of Canada (GC) Cloud Computing: Information Technology Shared Services (ITSS) 
Roadmap. Presentation. http://isacc.ca/isacc/_doc/ArchivedPlenary/ISACC-10-
43305.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
 23Eger, John M. 1978. “Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy 
Protections or Non-Tariff Barriers?” Law and Policy in International Business 10 (4): 
1065-66. 
 
ENISA. 2009a. Cloud Computing. Benefits, Risks and Recommendation for 
Information Security. http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/cloud-
computing-risk-assessment/at_download/fullReport (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
ENISA. 2009b. Cloud Computing Information Assurance Framework. 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-information-
assurance-framework (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
ENISA. 2011. Security & Resilience in Governmental Clouds. 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/emerging-and-future-risk/deliverables/security-
and-resilience-in-governmental-clouds/at_download/fullReport (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
European Commission. 2010. A Digital Agenda for Europe. COM(2010) 245 final/2. 
August 26. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Federal Information Processing Standards Application (FIPS). 2004. Standards for 
Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. FIPS PUB 
199.  
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf (accessed June 
25, 2011). 
 
Goldsmith, Stephen, and William D. Eggers. 2004. Governing by Network:  
The New Shape of the Public Sector, Washington: The Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Jaeger, Paul T., Jimmy Lin and Justin M. Grimes. 2008. “Cloud Computing and 
Information Policy: Computing in a Policy Cloud?” Journal of Information 
Technology and Politics 5 (3): 269 - 283. 
 
Jaeger, Paul T., Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes, and Shannon N. Simmons. 2009. 
“Where is the cloud? Geography, economics, environment, and jurisdiction in cloud 
computing”. First Monday 14 (5-4). 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2456/2171 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
 24Kroes, Neelie, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda. 2011. “Towards a European Cloud Computing Strategy”. Speech at the 
World Economic Forum, Davos, January 27. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/50&format=P
DF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Kundra, Vivek (US Federal Chief Information Officer). 2010. “State of Public Sector 
Cloud Computing.” 20 May 2010. 
http://www.info.apps.gov/sites/default/files/StateOfCloudComputingReport-
FINALv3_508.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Kundra, Vivek (US Federal Chief Information Officer). 2011. Federal Cloud 
Computing Strategy. http://www.cio.gov/documents/Federal-Cloud-Computing-
Strategy.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Kushida, Kenji E., Jonathan Murray and John Zysman. 2011. “Diffusing the Fog: 
Cloud Computing and Implications for Public Policy.” BRIE Working Paper 197. 
March 11, 2011. http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/wp197.pdf (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor, and David Lazer. 2007. “From Electronic Government to 
Information Government." In Governance and Information Technology, eds. Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger and David Lazer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-14. 
 
McKinsey. 2009. “Clearing the Air on Cloud Computing.” (On file with the author). 
 
Microsoft Corporation. 2010. “Building confidence in the cloud: A proposal for 
industry and government action to advance cloud computing.” 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/cloudpolicy/docs/ConfidenceWP.doc 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Nelson, Michael R. 2009. Cloud Computing and Public Policy. Briefing Paper for the 
ICCP Technology Foresight Forum, OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/47/43933771.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 2009. "NIST Definition of 
Cloud Computing V15." http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-def-v15.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
OECD. 1980. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data. Adopted on 23 September 1980. 
 25http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00&&
en-USS_01DBC.html (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
OECD. 2010a. “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines”. DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)6/FINAL. OECD Digital Economy Paper 176. 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=dsti/iccp/reg(2010
)6/final&doclanguage=en (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
OECD. 2010b. Greener and Smarter: ICTs, the environment and climate change. 
Background report for the OECD Technology Foresight Forum on “Smart ICTs and 
Green Growth”, on 29 September 2010. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/12/45983022.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Petersen, Zachary N. J., Mark Gondree and Robert Beverly. 2011. “A Position Paper 
on Data Sovereignty: The Importance of Geolocating Data in the Cloud”. Proceedings 
of HotCloud 2011. http://znjp.com/papers/peterson-hotcloud11.pdf (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
Philpott, Dan. 2010. "Sovereignty", In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/ (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
Rayport, Jeffrey F., and Andrew Heyward. 2009. “Envisioning the Cloud: The Next 
Computing Paradigm”. A MarketspaceNext Point of View. 
http://marketspacenext.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/envisioning-the-cloud.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Reed, Chris. 2010. “Information 'Ownership' in the Cloud.” Queen Mary School of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45/2010. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562461 (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Robinson, Nail, Helen Rebecca Schindler, Jonathan Cave and Janice Petersen. 2010. 
Cloud Computing in the public sector: rapid international stocktaking. Strategies and 
Impact. http://www.scribd.com/doc/40866691/Cloud-Computing-in-the-Public-Sector 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Spiegel Online International. 2010. “US Diplomats Told to Spy on Other Countries at 
United Nations”. November 28. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,731587,00.html (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
 26The Brookings Institution. 2010. "The Economic Gains of Cloud Computing”. 
Washington, D.C. Wednesday, April 7. 
www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0407_cloud_computing.aspx (accessed June 25, 
2011). 
 
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2006. Privacy Matters. The Federal 
Strategy to Address Concerns About the USA PATRIOT Act and Transborder Data 
Flows. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/gospubs/TBM_128/pm-prp/pm-prp-eng.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Thibodeau, Patrick. 2011. “Congress Urged to Leave Cloud Computing Alone”. 
Computerworld, April 12. 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9215750/Congress_urged_to_leave_cloud_c
omputing_alone_ (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
UK Cabinet Office. 2010a. Government ICT Strategy. Smarter cheaper greener. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304104621/http://www.cabinetoffice
.gov.uk/media/317444/ict_strategy4.pdf#page=23 (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
UK Cabinet Office. 2010b. Data Center Strategy, G-Cloud, & Government 
Applictions Store Programme Phase 2. 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/01-G-CloudVision.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills. 2009. Digital Britain. Final 
Report. http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7650/7650.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 1961. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 
500: 95. http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Walker, Molly Bernhart. 2011. “Kundra: Cloud computing data sovereignty a matter 
for 'international law'”, April 10. http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/kundra-
cloud-computing-data-sovereignty-matter-international-law/2011-04-
10#ixzz1OmRYO9fI (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
West, Darrell M. 2010a. “Saving Money Through Cloud Computing.” Governance 
Studies at Brookings. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0407_cloud_computing_west
/0407_cloud_computing_west.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
 27 28
West, Darrell M. 2010b. “Steps to Improve Cloud Computing in the Public Sector”. 
Issues in Technology Innovation 1, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0721_cloud_computing_west
/0721_cloud_computing_west.pdf (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
World Economic Forum. 2011. Advancing Cloud Computing: What To Do Now? 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_AdvancedCloudComputing_Report_2011.p
df (accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Wyld, David C. 2009. “Moving to the Cloud: An Introduction to Cloud Computing in 
Government”. E-Government Series. IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/CloudComputingReport.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2011). 
 
Wyld, David C. 2010. “The Cloudy future of Government IT: Cloud Computing and 
the Public Sector Around the World”. International Journal of Web and Semantic 
Technology 1 (1), 1-20. http://airccse.org/journal/ijwest/papers/0101w1.pdf (accessed 
June 25, 2011) 
  29